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Saturday, January 25, 2014

Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics - P3 Quyền lực mềm: Phương tiện để thành công trong chính trị thế giới – P3

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Soft Power: The Means to Succeed in World Politics - P3

Quyền lực mềm: Phương tiện để thành công trong chính trị thế giới – P3
CHAPTER  THREE: Others' Soft Power

THE  UNITED  STATES  has  enormous soft-power resources,  and has often used them effectively to achieve outcomes it wanted. Given America's role as  a leader of  the  information age,  the opportunities  for American soft power should  increase  if the nation  acts skillfully. But the United States is not alone. Others, both countries and nonstate actors, also possess soft power that can be used to help or hinder the United States' achievement of its preferred outcomes.

During the Cold War, America's  primary competitor in soft-power resources was the Soviet Union, which engaged in a broad campaign to convince the rest of  the world of  the attractiveness of  its Communist system. As mentioned in chapter 1, after 1945  the Soviet Union attracted many in Europe because of  its  resistance  to Hitler, and in colonized areas  such as Mrica and Asia  because of  its  opposition to European  imperialism. The utopian promise  of Communism appealed  to many people  in various  parts of the world,  and Moscow used  local  Communist Parties  to  serve  its  interests. The Soviet Union also  spent billions  on an  active  public  diplomacy program that included promoting its high culture, broadcasting, disseminating  disinformation  about  the West,  and  sponsoring  antinuclear protests, peace movements, and youth organizations.

High economic growth rates  in the early period of postwar reconstruction  bolstered  Soviet  claims  that  it would  overtake  the West. When Nikita Khrushchev visited  the United States  in  1959, many people  took seriously his  claim  that  the Soviet Union would one day bury the United States. The apparent success of  the Soviet planned economy provided the Soviets not only with hard resources but also  a degree of soft-power resources as well. The 1957  launch of Sputnik,  the  first  space  satellite,  led many people  in European countries to believe that the USSR was ahead of  the United States in space, and that science occupied a more respected position in Soviet culture than in American.! These investments not only had military implications  but also  advanced Soviet soft power  and  the Soviet Union's claims that Communism was "scientific socialism."

The USSR also placed great emphasis on demonstrating the superiority of its  cultural  and  educational  systems,  spending large sums on the arts. The Bolshoi and Kirov ballet companies and Soviet symphony orchestras  attracted wide  acclaim  (though  socialist realist art did not.) The Soviets also  invested heavily in sports,  and over the decades Soviet Olympic teams won more gold medals  than the U.S.  in  the Winter Games,  and were  second  in  the Summer Games.  Popular culture,  however, was  an  entirely different story. The closed nature of  the Soviet system and its constant efforts to exclude  bourgeois  cultural  influences meant  that the Soviet Union ceded  the battle  for mass  culture,  never competing with American global  influence  in film,  television,  or popular music. As we  saw  in the  last chapter, American music  and  films  leaked  into  the Soviet Union with profound  effects,  but the  indigenous  Soviet products never  found  an  overseas  market.  There was  no  socialist  Elvis. Government-sponsored efforts  like  the magazine Soviet Life or the television series Russian Language and People were faint echoes in  the empty hall of  popular culture. Soviet culture did not generate many soft-power resources.

Polls in Western Europe show how ineffective the Soviets were at  expanding their soft power. Their efforts  did  little  to  increase their attractiveness.  In 1959,  for example,  32  percent of  Italians,  24 percent of British, 17 percent of  French, and only 7 percent of Germans  had  a  good  opinion  of the USSR.  Ratings  for  the United States were much higher. In 1981, 21  percent of Italians,  12  percent of British,  19 percent of French and 8 percent of Germans had a favorable view of  the Soviets. Only in 1989, after Mikhail Gorbachev finally changed Soviet policies and brought an end to the Cold War, did Soviet favorability ratings  rise  to 65  percent among Italians,  59 percent among British, 45 percent among French, and a remarkable 71  percent among Germans  (albeit  the  Soviet  ratings were  still lower than those for the United States).2 Gorbachev's policy of  glasnost (openness) had a positive effect on Soviet soft power.

In science  and  technology,  classical music,  ballet,  and  athletics, Soviet culture was attractive, but the absence of  popular cultural exports  limited  its  impact.  Even more  important,  Soviet propaganda was  inconsistent with  its  policies. At home,  Soviet claims were undercut by the revelations that followed de-Stalinization in 1956, and later by an economic slowdown as  the central planning system failed to keep pace with markets that were becoming ever more flexible in the  advancing  information age.  In foreign  policy,  Soviet claims  to leadership of  progressive anti-imperial forces were belied by the invasion  of Hungary in  1956  and Czechoslovakia  in 1968  and  the crackdown in Poland in 1981. A closed system,  lack of  an attractive popular  culture,  and heavy-handed  foreign  policies meant  that  the Soviet Union was never a serious competitor with the United States in soft power during the Cold War.

Currently, the closest competitor to the United States in soft power resources is Europe. European art, literature, music, design, fashion, and food have long served as global cultural magnets. Taken individually, many European states have  a  strong cultural  attractiveness: half of  the ten most widely spoken languages in the world are European.[3]  Spanish and Portuguese link Iberia to Latin America, English is  the  language  of the United States  and  the  far-flung Commonwealth, and  there are nearly 50 Francophone countries who meet at a biannual summit at which they discuss policies and celebrate their status  as  countries having French in  common. France spends close to $1  billion a year to spread French civilization around  the world. As  seen  from  distant  Singapore,  "France's  soft  power  has  been
clearly maintained or even increased in the past fifty years, although Paris may no  longer be  the prime  intellectual,  cultural  and  philosophical capital of  the world."[4] But the soft power does not rest only on  language use.  One advocate  of "Asian values,"  former Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia, refers to the new concerns about environment and human rights as  "European values."[5]

In terms of  other potential soft power resources:
● France ranks first in Nobel Prizes for literature; Britain, Germany, and Spain are third, fourth and fifth.
●  Britain, Germany, and France rank second, third, and fourth in Nobel Prizes in physics and chemistry.
●  Britain, Germany, and France are third, fourth, and fifth (behind the U.S. and  Japan) in music sales.
●  Germany and Britain are third and fourth in book sales, and fourth and fifth as Internet website hosts.
● France ranks ahead of  the United States in attracting tourists (albeit heavily from its neighbors in Europe).
● Britain is  first and Germany  is  second in attracting applications for political asylum.
● France, Germany, Italy, and Britain have higher life
expectancy at birth than does  the U.S.
● Almost all European countries outrank the United States in overseas development assistance as a percent of GDP.[6]
●  Soccer, Europe's primary sport, is far more popular globally than American football or baseball.
●  European popular music has a global following.
●  European multinationals have brands with global name recognition.
●   Though much smaller than the United States, Britain and France each spend about the same as  the United States on public diplomacy.

No single European state can hope to compete with the United States  in size,  but taken as  a whole, Europe has a market of equivalent size, and a somewhat  larger population. Furthermore, the European Union as a symbol of  a uniting Europe itself  carries a good deal of soft power. Polls conducted in  July 2002  found  that a majority of Americans  had  a  favorable  image  of the  European Union,  and ranked  it fourth  for  its  influence  in  the world behind  the United States, Britain,  and China.? The idea  that war  is  now unthinkable among countries  that fought bitterly for centuries, and  that Europe has  become an  island of peace and prosperity creates a positive  image  in much  of the world.  In  the  late  1980s, when Eastern Europeans were  asked which  countries would  serve  as models  for  their future  in terms of economic growth,  equality,  democracy,  and  individual  freedoms, Western  Europe  outranked  the United  States. Even  in pro-American Poland,  a survey of Warsaw youth  in  1986 showed  that half would choose a West European country as  a place to  live  if given  a  free  choice,  compared  to  8 percent who would choose  the United States and 4 percent who would opt for another socialist country.  Both  the Polish and Czechoslovak election campaigns in 1989 were marked by the slogan "back to Europe."[8]

With the end of  the Cold War,  the goal of  joining the European Union became a magnet that meant the entire region of  Eastern Europe  oriented  itself toward Brussels.  In a  1991  poll,  75  percent in Czechoslovakia had  a  favorable  view  of the European Economic Community (64  percent said  the United States was  a good  influence).[9] The newly  free  countries  adapted  their domestic  laws  and policies  to conform with West European standards.  Ironically,  in 2003,  a  higher  portion  of people  in  the  13  candidate  countries ranked  the EU as  attractive (54 percent)  than did  citizens of  the 15 EU countries  themselves  (47  percent).[10] The historian Timothy Garton Ash has written  that Europe's  "soft power is  demonstrated by the fact that not only millions of  individuals but also whole states want to enter it. Turkey, for example."[11] In Turkey,  the desire to join the EU led the government to pass difficult legislation reducing the role of  the military in politics and improving Turkey's record on human rights issues.

This is why Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's efforts during the Iraq War to divide "old and new Europe" were so clumsy and heavy-handed. While the United States still enjoys  a fund  of goodwill  in Eastern Europe left over  from  its  opposition  to  the  Soviet Union during the Cold War, polls show that Eastern Europeans see their long-run future tied to the European Union and do not wish to have  to  choose  between Europe and  the United States. The EU knows that it holds this soft-power card and has used it to obtain the policy outcomes  it preferred.  For example, when President Bush called European leaders  in December 2002  to urge  them  to  admit Turkey to  the European Union,  they regarded his  calls  as  a cynical ploy to persuade Turkey to support the United States over Iraq, and he was  told that this would be a purely European decision.[12]

A measure of  the EU's emerging soft power is  the view that it is a positive force  for solving global problems. In the wake of  the Iraq War, Eastern Europeans and Turks gave  the EU higher marks  than the United States  for  playing  a positive  role  on a variety of issues ranging  from  fighting  terrorism  to  reducing poverty to protecting the  environment.  Despite  the  fact  that many Eastern European leaders  supported  the U.S.-led war,  their citizens  felt  that the EU plays a more positive role than the U.S. on a variety of  transnational issues.[13]  Shirley Williams,  a British political  leader,  has  concluded, "Europe's military strength,  its  'hard power,' may be  derisory  as Donald Rumsfeld  implied.  Its  'soft power'... is  formidable  indeed."[14] The vast majority of Americans  recognize  this  as  well: nearly nine in ten agree  that the EU can help solve world problems through diplomacy, trade, and development aid even though it  is not as militarily powerful as  the U.S.[15]

Of  course, Europe still faces  a number of  problems as its division over Iraq illustrated. It is united on trade, monetary policy, and agriculture,  and  increasingly on human  rights  and  criminal  laws.  It  is seeking a stronger constitution, which will create a presidency and a foreign minister,  but when  there  is  disagreement,  foreign  and  defense  policies will  remain  effectively with national  governments. Money and guns,  the  traditional high cards of hard state power,  remain  primarily under the control of the member states. Moreover, bureaucratic obstacles  and  rigid  labor markets may hamper rapid economic growth, and underlying demographic trends are unfavorable.  If  nothing changes, by 2050, the median age may be 52  (it will be  35  in  the U.S.). With a population  that is  not only aging but shrinking, Europe will have  to accept increasing numbers of  immigrants  (which  is  politically difficult)  or accept  that being older and smaller will diminish its influence in world affairs. As one demographer put it,  the Europeans  are  "aging in a world  that is  becoming younger. And in a global economy,  they're not going to share in the energy and vitality that comes with a younger population."[16]

At  the  same  time, many European domestic policies  appeal  to young populations in modern democracies. For example, European policies on capital punishment, gun control, climate change, and the rights  of homosexuals  are  probably  closer  to  the views  of many younger people in rich countries around  the world  than are American  government  policies.  The new  constitution  of South Africa bears more  resemblance  to  the European Convention on Human Rights  than  to  the American Bill  of Rights. The First Amendment expert Fred  Schauer points  out,  "On issues  of freedom  of speech, freedom of  the press, and equality,  for example,  the United States is seen as representing an extreme position, whether it be in the degree of  its  legal  protection of press misbehavior and of racist and  other forms of  hateful speech or  in its unwillingness to treat race-based affirmative action as explicitly constitutionally permissible."[17] It is also interesting that European precedents are now being cited in American  law. When  the American Supreme Court decided  the  case  of Lawrence  v.  Texas  regarding sexual  privacy  in  2003,  the majority opinion  cited  a  1981  decision  of the European Court of Human Rights for the first time.

On economic policies  as  well,  though many people  admire  the success  of the American  economy,  not all  extol  it as  a model  for other countries. Some prefer the European approach, in which government plays  a greater  role  in  the  economy  than  it does  in the United States.  Social safety nets and unions are  stronger and  labor markets more  regulated  in Europe. American  cultural  attitudes, bankruptcy laws,  and financial  structures more strongly favor entrepreneurs than do European ones, but many people in Europe object to  the price  of high  levels  of  inequality and  insecurity  that accompany America's greater reliance on market forces. America does better  than Europe  in  job  creation, with  less  than  half the  rate  of unemployment in Germany,  but The  Economist  concludes  that "the notion  that the American  economy stands  on  top  of the world  is questionable.  It is  also vulnerable  to  criticism  because  of its wider income inequality."[18] The lowest  10 percent of people in America's income distribution were only thirteenth from  the bottom in average income when compared with relatively poor people in other advanced  economies. Many Europeans  ranked higher. The superior job performance of the American  economy does not alone make  it more attractive than Europe's.[19] For example,  in the 1991 poll cited earlier, majorities in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria said  a social democracy along the lines of Sweden was most appropriate for their countries.[20]

In addition  to  its  attractive  culture and  domestic policies,  Europe  also  derives  soft power from  its  foreign  policies, which often contribute to global public goods. Of  course not all European policies  are  far-sighted-witness  its protectionist common agricultural policy, which damages farmers in poor countries-but Europe gains credibility from its positions on global climate change, international law,  and  human  rights  treaties. Moreover,  Europeans provide  70 percent of overseas development assistance to poor countries-four times more  than  the United States.  Europe  also  has  ten  times  as many troops  as  the United States  involved  in peacekeeping operations  under  multilateral  organizations  such  as  the  UN  and NATO.[21]  France took the lead recently in sending a mission  to the Congo. In 2003, France and Germany had more than twice as many troops  in Kosovo  as  the United  States,  and  Europeans working through NATO took charge of the  International Security Force  in Afghanistan.

Europeans have been less likely to shrink from  the hard tasks of nation building that America initially eschewed under the Bush administration. In many ways, Europeans are more adept and comfortable  than the United States  in deploying  the civilian resources  that enhance soft power. British Foreign Secretary  Jack Straw has argued, "Europe's  experience  in  the exercise  of the subtle art of soft power could  prove  indispensable  to  the reconstruction of Iraq. The EU tends  to exert its influence overseas via  the promotion of democracy and  development through trade and  aid. The results have been impressive in central and eastern Europe."[22]

In recent years Europeans have  also  been more  comfortable with  and  adept at using multilateral  institutions  than Americans. This is in part a reflection of  their experiences in the development of the European Union and in part a reflection of  their self-interest in seeking multilateral constraints on the world's only superpower. But whatever the reasons,  in a world where unilateralism is heavily criticized,  the European propensity toward multilateralism makes European  countries'  policies  attractive  to  many  other  countries. Europeans have used  their soft power in multilateral institutions  to deprive the United States of  the legitimizing effects of  such support. As  we  saw  in chapter  I, France was  able  to  create  a  coalition  that countered American  soft power by preventing a  second  Security Council resolution before the Iraq War. As  the political analyst Andrew Moravscik points out,  "In country after country,  polls  have shown  that a  second United Nations Security Council  resolution would  have  given public opinion a  30-40 per cent swing  towards military action."[23]  Instead,  the United States had  to pay a higher price than necessary for the war both in soft power and in the subsequent costs of  policing and reconstructing Iraq.

The European preference for multilateral cooperation has generated a  few  successes  that have  increased Europe's  soft power as well  as  its  economic power. Mter  a bumpy start,  the Airbus  consortium surpassed Boeing  as  the world's  leading manufacturer of commercial jetliners.  In  the mobile phone industry, European governments agreed  on a single  regulatory standard, GSM,  as  early as 1987, while Americans used  a market-driven  approach  to  allow  a standard  to emerge  and  dominate. The result was  that Europe developed  a stronger infrastructure  than  the United States  and was able  to dominate the wireless market in the 1990s.24 A future test of the European approach will be the Galileo global navigation satellite system, Europe's  answer  to  the U.S.-based Global Positioning System (GPS). While excessive bureaucracy can hamper the European approach,  the ability to work cooperatively on large information infrastructure  projects  that serve  as  global  public goods  can  increase Europe's soft power as well as  its economic power.

Europeans also invest more in their public diplomacy, as we shall see in the next chapter. The Europeans have  a longer tradition and spend more,  particularly in international cultural  relations,  an area in which France had  the highest per capita spending,  over $17  and more  than  four  times  that of second-ranked Canada; Britain and Sweden rank third and  fourth.  In  comparison, American State Department funding  for  international cultural programs spending was only 65  cents per capita.[25]  In  addition,  European countries  have been increasing their efforts to recruit students to their schools and universities from other parts of  the world.

Not only can European soft power be used to counter American soft power and raise the price of  unilateral actions, but it can also be a source  of assistance  and  reinforcement  for American  soft power and increase the likelihood of  the United States' achieving its objectives.  Soft power  can be  shared  and used  in  a cooperative  fashion. European promotion of  democracy and human rights helps advance shared values  that are  consistent with American objectives. The Islamist extremists  of AI  Qaeda are  fighting  against Western values, not  just American values, and European public diplomacy that counters their appeal is  beneficial to the United States.

French political leaders have often talked about creating a multipolar balance of  power, but many Europeans see such dreams as unrealistic in the current world situation. Most Europeans realize  that multilateral diplomacy is possible even without a multipolar military balance, and  they would be happy to share their soft power with the United States if we would be more consultative in our approach. As a sympathetic British observer put the point during the  Iraq war, "Maddening contradictions have  all  along been at  the  heart of the willful  destruction  of the  international security system during  the past  few  months.  The U.S.  quest  for  untrammeled  primacy  is doomed. America's  security and prosperity depend on its  political influence as much as on its military might. The U.S. has been strong because it has been admired."[26] In other words,  the extent to which the growth of European soft power is  an  asset or a liability for  the United States depends upon American policies and  rests very much on America's own choices. European soft power can be used to help or hurt the United States, depending on how America behaves.

Asian  countries  also  have  impressive potential  resources  for  soft power. The arts,  fashion,  and cuisine of Asia's  ancient cultures have already had  a  strong impact on other parts  of the world  for  centuries.  But Asia  also went through a period of relative  decline as  it lagged behind Western nations that went through the industrial revolution,  and  that cut into  its  influence. The Asian Development Bank has  calculated  that in 1820,  at the beginning of the  industrial age, Asia made up  an  estimated  three-fifths  of world  product. By 1940, this had fallen to one-fifth, even though the region was home to  three-fifths  of world population.  Rapid  economic growth has brought that back to  two-fifths  today,  and  the bank speculates  that Asia  could  return  to  its  historical  levels  by 202  5,27  In  the  last  two decades of the  twentieth century, China, Asia's  largest country, had high annual growth rates of 7 to 9 percent that led  to a remarkable tripling of its GNP and  enhanced  its  reputation  and  soft power. Nonetheless, even China has a long way to go, and faces many obstacles  to its development. At the beginning of  the twenty-first century, the American economy was more than twice the size of China's. And, as  a Singapore columnist observed, "When it comes to soft power, it will take much longer before it can make an impact close to what the V.S. enjoys now."[28]

In the 1950s, the mention of Asia conjured up images of  poverty and  starvation. There was  a brief political  infatuation among some in the West in the 1960s with Nehru jackets and Maoist revolution, but it was  relatively brief. As John Lennon sang at the height of  the antiwar movement,  "If you go  carrying pictures of Chairman Mao, you're not going to make it with anyone anyhow."[29] The real resurgence of Asia  began with the economic success of Japan. Asians often  refer  to  the  image  of geese  flying  in  formation  to  describe  the way  that smaller  countries  like  Singapore,  South Korea, Malaysia, and others closely followed Japan's strategy of  targeting strategic industries  for  development,  financing  major  projects,  exporting fiercely,  and protecting infant industries. One of Malaysia's  economic planners has noted, "Japan's experience of  rebuilding after the war,  the way it got workers  and management to cooperate and got the economy to grow in leaps and bounds, seems very Asian to us.  It has much more relevance  to our society than the experience of  the West."[30] Japan's  personal  income  increased  from  20 percent of the U. S. level in 1950 to 75  percent by the end of  the century, a remarkable performance that not only made Japanese wealthy but also  enhanced the country's soft power.

The Asian  economic miracle  helped  support an  ideology  of Asian values  that was  often  a convenient excuse  for  authoritarian leaders to maintain political stability. For example, Malaysia, Singapore,  and  Indonesia  resisted pressure  for more democracy and human rights on the grounds that the West was  trying to impose alien values  that favor  individual  rights  on  an  ancient culture where  the highest value  is  placed on the welfare  of society as  a whole. Asian values  became  an  assertion  of regional identity by nations  that had begun to flex  their economic muscle and to develop  their own political  systems.[31]  But after  the Asian  economic  crisis  of 1997  and  the consequent slowdown of growth  in many countries  in  the  region, other voices began to be heard. The New  York Times  reported, "Today,  there is a slow, daily tug of war between the old-guard traditionalists-the former Asian values  crowd-and the  insurgents  of an open  society, who  are  developing a  sort of indigenous version of Western values."[32] Asian  corporate models  rested heavily on family relationships  and  connections  to  government  that were  opaque  to outsiders. But, as The Economist observed, that "opacity costs money, as untrusting foreign investors demand bigger returns. And all Asian countries crave  the cloak of  international respectability from membership  of the OECD  club  to  the kudos  of hosting  the Olympic Games or World Cup."[33] The Asian economic miracle was  real and for  a  time  generated  soft power for  the successful  countries,  but when it ran into trouble in the 1990s,  it lost the clout to sustain the myth that it supported or resulted from Asian values.

Japan has more potential soft power  resources  than any other Asian  country.  It  is  the  first non-Western country that was  able  to fully modernize to the point of  equality with the West in  income and technology while  showing  that it is  possible  to maintain a unique culture. Today  Japan ranks...
●… first in the world in number of  patents
●… third in expenditure on research and development as  a percent of  gross domestic product
●… third in international air travel
●… second in book sales and music sales
●… second in the number of  Internet hosts
●… second in high-tech exports
●… first in development assistance
●… first for life expectancy[34]

Japan is home to three of  the top 25 multinational brand names, Toyota, Honda, and Sony.[35]  In the 1980s Japan derived considerable soft power  from  its manufacturing prowess. The writer Douglas McGray observed,  "Seeking guidance  on everything from  'quality circles'  to  'just  in  time'  inventory management,  U.S.  corporate executives  bought stacks  of books  on Japanese management  techniques."[36]

The decade-long economic slowdown  of the  1990S  tarnished Japan's reputation for economic prowess, but  it did not erase the nation's soft-power resources. "Instead of  collapsing beneath its political  and  economic misfortunes,"  writes McGray,  "Japan's  global cultural  influence has  only grown.  In fact,  from  pop music  to  consumer electronics, architecture to fashion, and food  to art, Japan has far  greater cultural  influence now  than  it did  in  the  1980s when  it was  an  economic  superpower."[37] Japanese manufacturers  rule  the roost in home video  games. Japanese  images  dominated  children's dreams quite handily over the last five  years with their mix of  cuteness  and  power.  Pokemon cartoons  are  broadcast  in 65  countries, and Japanese animation is a huge hit with American filmmakers and teenagers.  Its  style has  spilled  over  into American  design  trends  as well,[38] Japan's  popular  culture was  still producing potential soft-power resources even after its economy slowed down.

Japanese  cultural  attraction  is  not limited  to  its  pop culture. Japan's  traditional arts,  design,  and cuisine have  long found  followers  outside  the country. Authors  like Nobel Prize-winning Kenzaburo Oe have wide international audiences. In film, Akira Kurosawa is considered one of  the great directors of  all time. In classical music, Seiji Ozawa,  the former director of  the Boston Symphony, is widely renowned. Japan also  benefits from  the cultural attractiveness of  its traditional spiritual disciplines such as  Zen Buddhism and  the martial arts.

But there are also  limits  to Japan's soft power. Unlike Germany, which repudiated  its past aggression  and reconciled with its neighbors in the framework of  the European Union, Japan has never fully come  to  terms with  its  record  of foreign  aggression  in the  1930s. The residual  suspicion  that  lingers  in countries  such  as  China  and Korea sets limits on  Japan's soft power. Japan does not have  the full admiration of its Asian neighbors. A  I996 Japanese  poll  that asked which features of Japanese culture were attractive found  that 72  per-
cent of Chinese were  interested  in Japanese household  appliances and 6  I  percent in its style of  business management, but only 11  percent in  Japanese  television,  5 percent in Japanese music,  and 7 percent  in  the Japanese  lifestyle.[39]  Similarly,  a  200I  Newsweek  poll found  that where 65  percent of Americans found Japan "admirable" and only 27 percent  thought the  Japanese "arrogant," a mere 34 percent of South Koreans found Japan admirable and  59  percent considered the  Japanese arrogant.[40]

Like Europe, Japan faces  serious  demographic  challenges.  By the middle  of the  twenty-first  century Japan's  population  could shrink by 30 percent unless it attracts  I7 million immigrants, a difficult task in a country that has been historically resistant to immigration. Moreover,  the Japanese  language  is  not widely spoken,  and Japan's English  language  skills,  according  to  one  journalist,  rank "among the worst in Asia, making it difficult to attract international talent to its universities."[41] A recent  Japanese prime minister's commission on the nation's goals  in the twenty-first century called for a new  reinvention  of  Japan.[42]  Given  the weakness  of the political process,  the need for  further deregulation,  the aging of  the population, and the resistance to immigration, such change will not be easy and may take more  than a decade  to  complete.[43]  But given Japan's past record of  twice reinventing itself-after the Meiji revolution in the nineteenth century and after World War II-plus the undiminished skills of Japan's people, the stability of  its society, areas of  technological leadership (for instance, mobile Internet applications), and manufacturing skills, it is not impossible.

A decade ago some observers thought the close collaboration of government and industry in Japan would give it a lead in soft power in the information age. Japan could develop an ability to manipulate perceptions worldwide instantaneously and "destroy those  that impede Japanese  economic  prosperity  and  cultural  acceptance."[44] When Matsushita purchased the American motion picture company MCA,  its president said  that movies  critical of  Japan would not be produced.[45]  Japanese media  tried  to  break into world markets,  and the government-owned NHK network began satellite broadcasts in English. The venture  failed,  however,  as NHK's reports seemed  to lag behind those of  commercial news organizations, and the network had  to  rely on CNN and ABC  for  content.[46]  This does  not mean that  Japan lacks  soft-power resources.[47]  But  Japan's culture remains much more  inward-oriented  than  that of the U.S.,  and  its  government's  unwillingness  to deal  frankly with  the history of the  1930s continues  to  limit its  ability  to  transform  those  resources  into soft power in the sense of  obtaining the policy outcomes it desires.

Further in  the  future,  China and  India  loom as  the giants  of Asia, and there are already signs of  the expansion of  their soft-power resources.  In 2000,  the Chinese novelist Gao Xingjian won China's first Nobel Prize  for  literature,  followed  a year  later by the  Indian diaspora writer V.  S. Naipaul. In  June 1997, The New Yorker devoted an entire issue to fiction by Indian writers. The Chinese film Crouching Tiger,  Hidden Dragon  became  the highest-grossing non-English-language  film,  and  Indian  movies like  Monsoon  Wedding  were box-office successes  in the U.S.48 Yao Ming, the Chinese star of  the National Basketball Association's Houston Rockets,  could  become another Michael Jordan, and China is  set to host the 2008 Summer Olympics.  China's  investment in manned  space  flight  also  helps  to increase its prestige and attraction. Large expatriate communities in the United States-z.4 million Chinese  and  1.7 million  Indians have  increased  interest in  their home  countries  among Americans. Moreover, the transnational connections in the information industry are close, as U.S. high-tech companies increasingly employ affiliates in Bangalore or Chennai to provide real-time services here.

But the real promise for China and India still lies  in  the future. Rapid  economic growth  is  likely  to  increase  both countries'  hard and soft power, but at this point, neither country ranks high on the various  indices of potential soft-power resources  that are  possessed by the United States,  Europe,  and Japan. While culture provides some soft power, domestic policies and values set limits, particularly in China, where  the Communist Party fears  allowing  too much intellectual  freedom  and  resists  outside  influences.  Both countries have  a reputation for major corruption in government.  India benefits  from democratic politics, but still suffers from overly bureaucratized  government. And  the  recent revival  of Hindu extremism  and the killing of Muslims in Gujarat has  tarnished its democratic reputation. In foreign policy as well, both countries' reputations are burdened with the problems of  longstanding conflicts, over Taiwan and Kashmir,  respectively. Moreover, in the United States the attraction of an authoritarian China is  limited by the concern that it could become  a  threat sometime  in  the  future.  The soft power of Asian countries is  likely to increase in the future,  but at this stage they lag in soft-power resources behind the United States and Europe.

Of course smaller countries both in Asia  and other regions also enjoy soft power. South Korea and Thailand attract others  through their economic and democratic progress. Thailand has even discovered that foreigners love Thai food,  and its government set a goal of boosting the number of  Thai restaurants overseas as a way to "subtly help to deepen relations with other countries."[49] Soft power is  available  to all  countries,  and many invest in ways  to use  soft-power resources  to  "punch above  their weight"  in  international politics. As we  saw  in  chapter  I, Norway has  enhanced  its  attractiveness  by clever  policies  even  while  remaining  outside  the  EU.  And  for decades  the most trusted  countries  in Europe have  been  the  small countries of Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Benelux group.[50] For many countries,  the constitutional ideas of Canada "have been disproportionately influential,  perhaps more  influential  than  those of the United States."[51]  South Africa is widely admired for its progress in overcoming racial apartheid peacefully,  and Brazil projects a certain attraction both from  its vibrant culture  and  its promise  in  the future.  Even  if they do  not have  the  overall  power  resources  to match  the  largest countries,  smaller or less  powerful countries  still can present challenges greater  than  their military size would imply. And not only states can pose such challenges.

The information age has been marked by an increasingly important role of nonstate actors on the  international stage. Private organizations increasingly cross national boundaries. This is not totally new, but  the information revolution has led to a dramatic increase in scale in  recent years, with  the number of NGOs  (nongovernmental organizations)  increasing from  6,000  to approximately 26,000 during the 1990S alone. And  the numbers do not tell  the full story, because they represent only formally constituted organizations.[52]

Many non  governmental organizations  claim  to act as  a "global conscience" representing broad public interests beyond the purview of individual  states. They develop  new norms  directly by pressing governments and business  leaders  to change policies, and indirectly by  altering  public  perceptions  of what  governments  and  firms should be  doing.  In  terms  of power  resources,  these new groups rarely possess much hard power (although it  is worth noting that the budget of Greenpeace  in  2001  was  $157 million,  compared  to  the $90 million budget of the  intergovernmental World Trade Organization).  In any event,  the  information  revolution has  greatly enhanced  NGOs'  soft  power.[53]  Because  they  are  able  to  attract followers,  governments have  to take NGOs into account as  both allies  and  adversaries.  From  the American  point of view,  it is  worth noting that Brussels, London,  and Paris  rank ahead of Washington and New York  as  host  cities  for  international nongovernmental organizations.[54]

Not only  the  number  of transnational  contacts  but  also  the number of  types of  these organizations has  increased. A few decades ago,  large bureaucratic organizations with hefty budgets  like multinational corporations or the Roman Catholic church were the most typical type of  transnational organization. The soft power of  corporate brand names has been familiar  for  decades.  Such organizations remain important, but the reduced cost of  communication in the Internet era has opened the field  to loosely structured network organizations with little headquarters staff, and even to individuals. This is part of  the democratization of  technology that we discussed in chapter 1. These  flexible  nongovernmental organizations  and networks are particularly effective in penetrating states without regard to borders. Because  they often involve  citizens who are well placed in the domestic politics of several countries, such networks are  able  to focus  the  attention of the media and  governments  on  their issues. They create a new type of  transnational political coalitions. For example,  the coalition  to ban  land mines  brought  together NGOs, celebrities, and politicians in many countries.

The information revolution makes states more porous. Governments now have to share the stage with actors who can use information to enhance  their soft power and press governments directly,  or indirectly by mobilizing  their publics. Given  the power of credible editors and  cue  givers who  can cut through  the avalanche of available  information in  the  Internet age,  a rough way  to gauge  the  increasing importance of  transnational organizations  is  to look at the number of mentions  that these organizations receive  in mainstream media publications. By  this measure,  the biggest NGOs have  become established players in the battle for  the attention of  influential editors.  For example,  after Human Rights Watch  released  its  2003 World Report,  which  included  strong criticism of the U.S.  government for  its  conduct in  the war  on  terrorism,  articles  appeared  in 288 newspaper and magazines over the next ten days mentioning the organization.[55]

News coverage over the past decade has reflected the growth of this general sector; the use of  the term "nongovernmental organization" or "NGO" has increased 17-fold since 1992. Not only Human Rights Watch but also other NGOs such as Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, Greenpeace, Doctors without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres),  and Transparency International have undergone  exponential  growth  in  the number of their mainstream media mentions.

In the information age, governments that want to see rapid economic growth find  that they can no longer maintain the barriers to information flows  that historically protected officials  from  outside scrutiny. Even large countries with hard power,  such as  the United States,  are  affected.  For example,  a campaign by NGOs helped  to scuttle a proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the late 1990S,  and NGOs used  the  Internet to plan  the disruption  of the World Trade Organization  summit  in  1999  that became known  as the  "battle  of Seattle." The Pentagon opposed  a  treaty banning landmines,  but a mixed  coalition of Internet-based organizations working with middle-power governments such as  Canada and individual politicians and celebrities such as Princess Diana was  able  to bring  the  treaty  into  existence  in  1997. Another  example  is  the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control  that was  ratified  in May 2003  by the  192 members of  the World Health Organization. The United States  initially had  strong objections  to  the  treaty but dropped them in the face of  international criticism.[56]

A  fascinating  use  of the  Internet to wield  soft power  can be found  in the politics of diaspora communities. David Bollier,  an expert on the impact of digital  technologies, notes,  "The Internet has been a godsend  to  such populations  because  it enables  large numbers  of geographically isolated  people with a shared history  to organize into large virtual communities."[57] The Internet enables them to present attractive  alternative  ideas  to  those back home.  Internet connections between  foreign  nationals  and  local  citizens helped  to spark protests  in Beijing against anti-Chinese  riots  taking place  in Indonesia  in  1998. The frustration  of ethnic Chinese  living  in Indonesia was  transferred to Beijing with remarkable speed. Similarly, in Zimbabwe,  the Internet was crucial in spreading news about government actions during disputed elections.

One example  of a diaspora  group  that has  effectively used  the Internet and other media sources  to  affect political outcomes in its home country is  the Ghanaian  expatriate  community.  In the  elections  of 2000,  the  first  real  opportunity for Ghanaians  to change their government through democratic means,  the diaspora network was crucial in mobilizing support and money for the opposition candidate. Online community networks such as  the Ghana Cybergroup (GCG), established in 1999 in New York, mobilized the diaspora  in the United States  to  aggressively campaign  for  regime  change  in Ghana.  In 2000,  GCG members were  encouraged  to  "find  every means  (email,  phone,  etc)  to  communicate with  their  families  at home  to  go  out and vote"  in  the national elections. And  now the GCG has refocused its mission on attracting development assistance for Ghana, and is in the process of  establishing a network among the 2.5  million Ghanaian  expatriates  to  increase  the  flow  of capital  to their home country.[58]

Transnational corporations often are  the  target of NGO activities such as campaigns to "name and shame" companies that pay low wages to laborers in poor countries. Such campaigns sometimes succeed because they can credibly threaten to deprive  the corporations of  the soft power of  their valuable global brand names. When Shell proposed deep-ocean disposal of its Brent Spar drilling  rig, which allegedly would  have  polluted  the  ocean,  Greenpeace  organized  a boycott campaign  that forced  Shell  to  opt for more costly dismantling on shore.  Ironically, when it was  later disclosed  that the original Shell proposal was  better for  the  environment, Greenpeace's reputation and soft power suffered. In any event, Shell decided  that it had  to increase its attention to NGOs:  the company also  recently announced that it would not drill in any spots designated UNESCO World Heritage  sites. This decision  came  two years  after Shell acceded to pressure from environmentalists and scrapped plans to drill in a World Heritage site  in Bangladesh.[59]  Transnational drug companies were  shamed  by NGOs  into  giving  up  lawsuits  in  South Africa  in  2002  over  infringements  of their patents  on AIDS  drugs because,  the Financial Times  reported,  "demands  for  greater  social responsibility from business are getting louder, better organized and more popular." Similar campaigns of naming and shaming have affected  the  investment and  employment patterns of Mattel, Nike, and a host of  other companies.

NGOs vary enormously in  their organization,  budgets,  the accountability  to  their members,  and  their sense  of  responsibility for he accuracy of their claims.  Their soft power varies  accordingly. While  some NGOs are more  credible  and  trusted  than governments, others are not. Overall, a recent poll in Europe found  that 42 percent of Europeans tended to trust NGOs whereas 36 percent expressed  distrust.  In  Britain and Germany,  however,  the number of those who  distrusted NGOs exceeded  those who  trusted  them.[60] Thus  it is  hyperbole when  activists  call  such  organizations  "the world's  other superpower,"  but at  the  same  time,  governments  ignore them at their peril. Some have  reputations and credibility that give  them  impressive  domestic  as  well  as  international  political clout. Others may lack credibility among moderate  citizens,  but have  organizational  and  communication skills  that allow  them  to mobilize demonstrations  that governments  cannot ignore.  Few international meetings can be planned today without consideration of the prospect of demonstrations.  For better and  for worse, NGOs and  network organizations have  soft-power  resources  and  do  not hesitate to use them.

For centuries,  organized  religious movements  have  possessed soft power. The Roman Catholic church  is  organized  on a global scale,  and many Catholics around  the world adhere  to its  teachings on  issues  like  birth control and  abortion because of attraction,  not coercion.  Other religious  organizations-among them Protestant, Islamic, and Buddhist-have extensive missionary efforts  that have attracted millions of  people to adhere to their teachings, particularly in Latin America and Africa in recent decades. But as we  saw in the last chapter, intolerant religious organizations can repel as well as attract.  In  some  circumstances  aggressive  proselytizing can destroy rather than create soft power.

Intergovernmental organizations such as  the United Nations or the World Trade Organization can also  develop soft power.  Strictly speaking,  they are the creatures of  the states  that formed  them, but the diplomacy within different organizations takes on characteristics that reflect  the unique procedures  and culture of the organization. Thus, for example,  the reputation of  the United Nations cannot be understood without contrasting  the  roles  of the General Assembly (with its rhetoric) and  the Security Council (with its vetoes),  as well as  the deference  to regional caucuses  that produces damaging aberrations  such  as  Libya's  chairing  the Human Rights  Commission. The personality and skill of  the secretary-general can also affect the reputation  of the organization. Like  the  pope, Kofi Annan  commands few troops, but his popularity and position assure attention to his statements.

The UN is  not the only source of  legitimacy in world  politics, but its  universality,  legal  framework,  and  relative  attractiveness  do give  its votes  and  pronouncements  a considerable  degree  of  legitimacy. The UN's reputation, and thus its soft power, is susceptible to changing political events. For example, the American decision to enter the Iraq War without a second Security Council resolution hurt the UN's as well as America's  reputation and  led majorities in 19 of 21  countries polled to say that the UN was no longer as important as it had  been  in dealing with  international conflicts.[61]  On  the  other hand,  over two-thirds  in  the U.S.  and European populations  still rate the UN favorably after the war.[62] The overall reputation of  the UN has fluctuated over the years. In Europe, post-Iraq War trust in the UN is  below the  trust level of 2002,  but it remains comparable to  the 1990s.  In  the United States, overall  favorable  ratings for  the UN have rebounded to prewar levels after a brief dip. The UN's job approval rating in the United States was actually lower in the 1980s than before the Iraq War (28  percent in August 1985;  38  percent in March 2003) and hit  its historic low during the Korean War (23  percent in May 1951).[63] The attractiveness and soft-power resources of the UN vary over time and have limits, but governments cannot afford to ignore it without paying a price.

Soft power can also adhere to malevolent organizations and networks. Soft power depends on a receptive audience even if  the eye of the  beholder  is  evil.  Transnational  terrorist organizations  like AI Qaeda may be  repulsive  to  the majority of the world,  but they are clearly attractive  to some extremists.  If  the Soviet Union and Communism presented the most dangerous soft-power challenges  to  the United States in the Cold War era,  today's greatest challenge comes from  radical  Islamist  ideology and organizations.  In particular,  the fundamentalist Wahhabi  sect,  which  originated  on  the Arabian peninsula in the eighteenth century, has been augmented by radical outgrowths of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which arose  in Egypt in the 1920S. Ironically, Sayyid Quttb, a key intellectual figure for  radical  Islamists, was  a Muslim Brother who  lived  for  a  short time  in the United States and was  disgusted by what he considered the meaninglessness of American life.[64] As noted before, culture that is attractive to many can be repulsive to some.

The rise  of radical  Islamism  received  a good  deal  of state help from  Saudi Arabia, where  the  ruling family  agreed  to propagate Wahhabism as a means of  propitiating the clerics, thus buying "their own political legitimacy at the cost of  stability elsewhere."[65] Because funding  of Wahhabist institutions  comes  from  both Saudi government ministries and private charities,  it is virtually impossible to estimate the total spending. One expert testified to Congress  that the Saudis had spent roughly $70 billion on aid projects since the 1970s, and  others  report that they sponsored  1,500 mosques  and  2,000 schools worldwide  from  Indonesia  to France.[66]  These  institutions often displace more moderate and worse-funded  institutions promulgating moderate interpretations of  Islam.[67]  Even if  these numbers are  incorrect,  a  fraction  of the  dollar  figures  still  dwarfs what the United States has spent on public diplomacy in the Muslim world.

Ironically,  the soft power of Wahhabism has not proved  to be a resource  that the Saudi government could control or use  to  obtain favorable  outcomes.  Instead,  it has been like  a sorcerer's apprentice that has  come  back  to  bedevil  its  original  creator. The radicals  regard the royal family as corrupt and in league with Western infidels. They aim  to overthrow or disrupt  the government,  and  launched
terrorist attacks  in Riyadh  in 2003. The royal  family's  bargain with the Wahhabist clerics  has  backfired  because  the soft power of Islamic radicalism has flowed in the direction of Osama bin Laden and his goal of overthrowing the Saudi government, not in the direction of making the Saudi government more secure.

A snapshot of this  situation was  captured by a poll  taken  in a number of predominantly Muslim countries  shortly after  the  Iraq War.  Pluralities  in Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco,  and  the Palestinian Authority said  they had  a  lot or some  confidence  in Osama bin Laden  to  do  the  right thing regarding world  affairs.  In those  same  countries, vast majorities had more  confidence  in bin Laden than in George W. Bush or Tony Blair. Although it  is not surprising  that many Muslims  had negative  feelings  about Bush and Blair  in  the aftermath of a war against a Muslim country,  the  fact that bin Laden inspired confidence sent a clear message  to Americans about the soft power of  its sworn enemy. Similar anecdotal evidence  abounded  in  the  fall  of 2001  in  the  aftermath of 9/11, when reports came from Africa that "Osama" was now a popular name for baby boys, and from Pakistan, where bin Laden T-shirts were selling well.  In part this may be a new twist in the long tradition of Robin Hood legends among the poor and disenfranchised, but it also  represents deeper trends in Islamic opinion. Because the war on terrorism  involves  a  civil war  between  radicals  and moderates within Islamic  civilization,  the  soft power of the Islamists  is  a disturbing symptom  and  a warning of the need  for Americans  and  others  to find  better ways  of projecting soft power  to strengthen the moderates. Moderate churches and synagogues can play a role with moderate Muslims.  In all three religions the prophet Abraham is a revered figure,  and  so  the  idea of an Abrahamic  dialogue  among Muslims, Christians, and  Jews may be an example of  the ways that nongovernmental actors can exercise their soft power and create bridges of  understanding.

THE  UNITED  STATES  is  the world's only military superpower. It also  remains  the world's mightiest country in terms of economic  and  soft power,  but America  is  not nearly as  dominant in these two domains of  power as in the military domain. The trends of the information age and the spread of  democratization should benefit American  soft power  in  the  future,  but they will  also  benefit Europe and other countries that are able  to adapt to the new conditions. More problematically,  the  trends of the  information age will increase  the  soft power of nonstate  actors,  both good  and  bad. To cope with a world in which the soft power of  others is increasing, the United States will  have  to  invest more  in its  own  soft-power  resources, and learn to wield its soft power more effectively.

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