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Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Whales take Northwest Passage as Arctic sea-ice melts -Cá voi đi về phía Tây Bắc do băng tan

Whales take Northwest Passage as Arctic sea-ice melts -Cá voi đi về phía Tây Bắc do băng tan
Tagging a bowhead
Bowhead whales were tagged on both sides of North America - and met up halfway round the top


Map of bowhead distribution
The classical map of bowhead distribution does not include the Northwest Passage - an update may be looming


Bowhead whales, the giants of the Arctic, are using the Northwest Passage to move across the top of the Americas.
Skeletons, DNA samples and harpoon heads have all suggested that bowhead populations living on each side of the continent did meet and mingle.
Now, research published in the journal Biology Letters has used satellite tags to provide confirmation.
The work may provide insights into the development of Arctic cultures in which bowhead hunting plays a central role.
Mads Peter Heide-Jorgensen from the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources led a team that has satellite-tagged more than 100 bowheads over the last decade - much of the work funded by oil and gas companies interested in the Arctic's new mineral wealth.
Last August, as the Arctic sea ice neared its annual minimum, the satellite data told them that one whale from the Greenland side and one from the Alaskan side had arrived in pretty much the same area, north of the Canadian mainland.
They spent about 10 days circling in the same patch of water before heading back to their respective home ranges.
This is the first time such mingling has been seen directly, although there is plenty of circumstantial evidence that it has happened sporadically in the past.
Bowhead skeletons are found on elevated beaches through the Canadian archipelago. In 19th Century Alaska, whales were caught containing tips of harpoons that had been thrown by whalers in the Atlantic.
Passage may have been easier in the last four summers than in preceding decades, as the Arctic ice has shrunk to a smaller size than at any time in the satellite record.
"I'm pretty sure that the low sea ice in the summer has triggered this migration through this area," Dr Heide-Jorgensen told BBC News.
"I'm pretty sure that when it occurred in the past, when we got all these skulls on the beach, that was during a warm period.
"During any climatic period, there could have been years with less ice in the Northwest Passage; and I'm pretty sure the bowheads can find cracks [in the ice] that are too small to show up on satellite images."

MP Heide-Jorgensen
The other fascinating line of evidence for bowhead migration along northern Canada lies in the human societies that depend on the whales, where communities are structured around the process of whaling.
The best known example today are the Inupiat of Alaska.
They are descended from the Thule culture, which appears to have emerged in Alaska about 1,000 years ago.
Thule people spread across Canada to Greenland in the three centuries following.
They ate meat and blubber from the bowhead, built houses using their bones and burned their oil.
Traditional whaling boat Arctic whaling culture, ancient and modern, hinges around the bowhead
Given their dependence on the single species, could they have made the migration without access to the whales?
Anne Jensen, an archaeologist who has lived in the northern Alaskan town of Barrow for many years and is a leading authority on the Thule people, said the routes taken by the two whales last year passed close by sites that date the Thule expansion.
"This supports the idea that the expansion was connected to whaling," she told BBC News.
"People were moving - presumably after having done some small-group exploring that is archaeologically invisible - to places where they knew whales went, perhaps in a period when the ice cover was reduced for some reason.
"Certainly, they were not settling in places where whales weren't available at that point.
"Since the Thule seem to have been able to hunt whales from the ice at leads, it doesn't mean that there was an ice-free Northwest Passage - just one that bowheads could get through, with enough leads for hunters to see and catch the whales."
Of all the great whales, the bowheads are the best adapted to life in the harsh Arctic environment, with a domed bony head that can force a way through relatively thin sheets of ice, and a thick layer of blubber.
"They have their lunch package on them - they can move for months without eating because they have blubber almost half a metre thick, so so they can move through the Northwest Passage without eating," said Dr Heide-Jorgensen.
Continue reading the main story

Bowhead whale
Genetic evidence also suggests that in periods past, bowheads also moved along the northern coast of Siberia.
They do not have a set migration pattern, unlike some other whale species - which raises questions about how they may adapt in future, if the projected declines in summer Arctic sea ice materialise.
"I'm sure they will be going all over the area when there's open water," said Dr Heide-Jorgensen.
"They're capable of moving relatively long distances in a short period of time, and they can venture into areas where we haven't seen them for a very long time - so I'm sure they will use the open water if the ice disappears."
The one question mark would be over their food supply, with major changes in Arctic sea ice likely to disrupt food webs that include the swarms of copepods (tiny crustaceans) that are the key ingredient of their diet.

Traditional whaling boat
Arctic whaling culture, ancient and modern, hinges around the bowhead


Bowhead whale
Guide to the 'great whales'

HMS Erebus and Terror depicted in the Northwest Passage
Franklin famously assaulted the Northwest Passage in 1859 - but voyages are now more routine


Powerful Typhoon Roke hits Japan - Bão Nhiệt đới đổ bộ Nhật Bản

BBC's Roland Buerk: "There are concerns that rain could force radioactive water into the sea" Footage


courtesy of TV Osaka

A powerful typhoon has struck Japan, bringing torrential rains and floods that have killed five people.
Typhoon Roke is now closing in on Fukushima, where engineers are still struggling to bring a nuclear plant under control after the March tsunami.
There are concerns heavy rain could force radioactive water into the sea.
The storm, packing winds of 162km/h (100mph), passed near Tokyo stranding tens of thousands of commuters as trains and flights were cancelled.
The typhoon made landfall on Wednesday afternoon (05:00GMT) in Hamamatsu, scouring its way up the main island of Honshu.
The storm is now tracking a path towards Fukushima prefecture and is then expected to travel up along the north-east coast, which was battered by the 11 March earthquake and tsunami.
The BBC's Roland Buerk in Tokyo says pools of radioactive water remain at the Fukushima nuclear site, and there is concern that a heavy downpour could cause them to overflow into the sea or groundwater.
A spokesman for Tepco said the firm was taking "every possible measure against the typhoon".
"We have tied down cables and hoses while fixing equipment so that radioactive materials will not spread [in violent winds]," said Naoki Tsunoda.
He said the work on the ground and at sea had been suspended.
Caution urged
Five people have so far been found dead in central and western Japan, public broadcaster NHK reported.
Four people are missing including a nine-year-old boy and 84-year-old man who were swept away by flood waters in Gifu prefecture as the storm approached.


The Land of Gas and Honey - Mảnh đất Dầu khí và Mật Ong

The Land of Gas and Honey - Mảnh đất Dầu khí và Mật Ong

Israel's giant new natural gas find will transform the Middle East -- and add more fuel to an already combustible region.

BY ROBIN M. MILLS | SEPTEMBER 15, 2011

Mother Nature's distribution of oil and gas resources around the world suggests she has a mischievous sense of humor. In the Persian Gulf, South China Sea, and Caspian Sea, large fields lie in disputed zones between unfriendly neighbors.
Now we must add another hot spot to that list. New, giant, natural gas finds promise to transform the energy security and economy of Israel and, perhaps, its neighbors. But these treasures could hardly have been better placed to stir up trouble, complicating three of the world's most intractable conflicts: between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Lebanon, and Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The recent sharp deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations makes disputes over gas even more fraught with danger.
Golda Meir, the feisty, cantankerous, and quotable fourth Israeli prime minister, used to complain that Moses led the Israelites through the desert for 40 years to bring them to the only place in the Middle East without oil. In 2000, after Britain's BG had discovered significant volumes of gas at Gaza Marine, she was proved at least half-wrong when U.S. exploration company Noble Energy found a similar-sized field, Mari-B, in Israeli waters.
In 2009, though, Noble put these efforts completely into the shade. Some bold and creative geological thinking led it to find 8.5 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of gas in deep water at Tamar, the world's largest discovery that year. In late 2010, Noble uncovered an even larger field, aptly named Leviathan, containing 16 Tcf. These fields alone could meet U.S. gas demand for an entire year.
The Levant Basin, the geological area containing Tamar and Leviathan, spans not only Israel's offshore but also that of Lebanon, Cyprus, and Syria. The U.S. Geological Survey estimates it could contain 120 Tcf of gas, equivalent to almost half of U.S. reserves. Given that Cyprus, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian territories between them have a population of less than 17 million, that's potentially a huge windfall.
The gas, therefore, suddenly eliminates one of Israel's key strategic and economic weaknesses: its lack of indigenous energy resources. Tamar alone could supply all of Israel's power plants for more than 20 years. And the discoveries are very timely, because Mari-B will be depleted by 2013 and because of the sudden insecurity of Egyptian gas imports.
Israel receives about 40 percent of its gas consumption from Egypt, though the deal is deeply unpopular there, with ex-president Hosni Mubarak and his cronies accused of underpricing the gas and profiting corruptly from sales. The pipeline through the volatile Sinai has been attacked five times this year, cutting supplies and forcing Israel to raise electricity prices by almost 10 percent in August to cover the increased costs of burning oil.
Replicating Israel's success would likewise transform the prospects of energy-poor Lebanon and Cyprus. Cyprus is still reeling from the accidental destruction of its main power station, blown up in July by confiscated Iranian munitions stored with remarkable carelessness next to it.

Noble has been given the green light by the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia to go ahead with drilling in Cypriot waters adjacent to Leviathan. In contrast, Lebanon and Syria have been painfully slow to realize their opportunity. Major oil companies had looked at the area as early as 2001, yet Lebanon's fractious parliament only passed an oil law in 2010 after enviously eyeing Israel's success. Syria had planned to award exploration blocks this year, but this seems unlikely as long as the uprising against the Assad regime continues.

Meanwhile, the unfortunate people of Gaza, whose field arguably started the whole rush, suffer from daily power cuts. Long negotiations to develop their gas predictably went nowhere because the Israelis had no intention of giving the Palestinian Authority an additional source of revenue, especially after Hamas's 2007 takeover of the strip.

The Israelis now have an abundance of riches. They could export gas to Jordan, whose economy is struggling under the burden of expensive oil. The Jordanians, though, might play them off against Iraq, a more politically palatable supplier that will also have excess gas to sell within a few years.

Other than that, without any friends in the region, the Israelis will have to look west for markets. They could have built a pipeline through Cyprus and on to Turkey and mainland Europe. But, with impeccable timing, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government has escalated a war of rhetoric against Turkey, as Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman reportedly threatened with his characteristic finesse to arm the Kurdish PKK group.

Instead, Israel will probably require more costly and complicated liquefaction facilities in order to ship the gas by tanker to customers in Southern Europe.

The other problem is the region's territorial disputes. Israel and the Republic of Cyprus -- that's the Greek one -- have delineated their maritime border and have shared economic interests. But the maritime border between Israel and Lebanon is not demarcated, and Lebanon has weakened its position with diplomatic missteps while each side has submitted its own claims. These will be hard to resolve: International courts and arbitration do not apply while the two states have no diplomatic relations, and Israel has not signed the 1994 Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The actual overlapping claims area is surprisingly small, and it seems clear that Tamar and Leviathan lie in Israeli waters. Yet Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to retaliate against Israel's gas installations for any attempt to "steal" Lebanese natural resources. It appears that underwater gas could become another Shebaa Farms issue, a minor territorial claim exploited to perpetuate the Lebanese-Israeli conflict.
The Israelis are probably well capable of defending offshore installations against Lebanese or Palestinian threats, particularly as the wells will be on the seabed beneath 1,600 meters of water. Turkey is an entirely different matter. Turkey, of course, recognizes neither EU member Cyprus, having backed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus since the 1974 war and partition of the island, nor the Cyprus-Israel accord.

Turkish Cypriot President Dervis Eroglu said in early August that Cyprus's gas (not a molecule of which has yet been discovered) belonged not only to Greek Cypriots but to Turkish Cypriots and Turkey too.

Turkish pressure is likely to push Cyprus deeper into Israel's willing embrace. Solon Kassinis, head of Cyprus's Energy Service, fired back at the Turks, "I expected Turkey to bark, but I don't think they will do anything ... if they want to be considered a country that respects international law." Greece, which has been wooed by Israel following its rupture with the Turks, vowed to defend Greek Cypriot sovereignty.

The most explosive issue, however, is the rupture of Turkish-Israeli relations. Although Turkey has no maritime border with Israel, nor much prospect of sharing in the offshore gas bounty, the Cyprus and Lebanon disputes give it an excellent opening to retaliate for Israeli intransigence over the Gaza-bound flotilla raid and other areas of dispute.

Interviewed by Al Jazeera, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared on Sept. 8, "Turkey will not allow Israel exclusive use of the resources of the Mediterranean Sea" and said he planned to dispatch three frigates to confront Israeli warships. Israeli Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau responded, "Israel can support and secure the rigs that we are going to have in the Mediterranean." But in the current political climate, neither Turkey nor Lebanon wants to give Israel an easy path to riches.

The United States has urged Turkey and Israel to ease tensions, while saying that it viewed the gas discoveries overall as positive. In a few years, if all goes well, some brave soul in Congress might question the irony of a major gas exporter's being the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid.

But in the short term, the lure of riches makes conflict resolution more difficult and gives hard-liners on all sides another casus belli. Tamar and Leviathan are unfortunately not the catalyst for regional peace and prosperity, but, rather, more fuel in an already combustible mix.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/15/the_land_of_gas_and_honey?page=0,2&wpisrc=obinsite

Why doesn't rioting happen more often? - Tại sao bạo loạn không xảy ra thường xuyên

Riots in London, and a peaceful street scene
The recent disturbances in English cities prompted many to ask why disorder had broken out. But is the real question why disorder happens so rarely, asks Jamie Whyte.

Thomas Hobbes
Thomas Hobbes thought our natural state was not pleasant

Why doesn't rioting happen more often?

Many commenting on the recent riots and looting in England betrayed a short-term and local perspective.
They asked how such a thing could have happened, as if peace and good order are the natural condition of men, so that departures from it need some special explanation, such as the injustice of cutting government spending or the racism of the police.
Yet rioting and looting are profitable but enjoyable. Indeed, enjoyable may be putting it too politely.
Creating mayhem, inducing fear in others and destroying what they have laboured to build are intoxicating experiences, especially for young men. The mystery is not how an eruption of such passions could have happened at all, but why it does not happen all the time.
"What needs explaining is why they don't occur, not why they do occur. And they don't occur in England, on the whole," observes philosopher Roger Scruton.
A modern Briton enjoys a level of security - both in his person and his property - that would strike our distant ancestors, and many people living in other parts of the world today, as near miraculous. How have we achieved it?
Not through simple authoritarianism. It would take only a small percentage of the population to become lawless all at once, to take what they like and damage what they dislike, and the police would be overwhelmed.
We enjoy civil order in Britain only because people choose to follow the rules. We live in a society of voluntary co-operation, neither chaotic nor oppressive. This is an extraordinary achievement, which must be understood to be maintained.
Many left-wing commentators, including Harriet Harman, the deputy leader of the Labour Party, claimed that the recent riots were caused by the "social injustice" of cutting government spending from 48% of gross domestic product (GDP) to 46%, as the government plans to do over the next four years. Implicit in this is the idea that civil order depends on social justice.
The idea here cannot be that material hardships cause unruly behaviour. Those who rioted in England in August are much better off than more law-abiding people in other countries and more law-abiding Englishmen from earlier decades.
No, the thesis must be psychological. It must be that the perceived injustice of society causes the unwillingness to play by the rules. The political philosopher George Klosko put it the other way round: "A necessary condition for people to be willing to obey the law is their perception that the political system - the overall system of distribution of benefits and burdens - is acceptably fair."
I don't buy it. For a start, people disagree so much about what is fair and what not, that we might expect a large minority of the population to consider any social arrangement unfair. Yet only a tiny minority of Britons fail generally to abide by the rules.
It is precisely because our sense of fairness is insufficient to prevent us from coming into potentially lethal conflict with each other that we need a system of laws, enforced by some third party.
This was the fundamental insight of Thomas Hobbes, the 17th Century philosopher, who argued in his Leviathan that the proper function of the state was to protect us from the horrors of living without one.
In a state of nature, he argued, life would be "nasty, brutish and short". Our sense of fairness cannot stop us from coming into conflict with each other because we all want roughly the same things, resources are scarce and we are all of roughly equal power. (No matter how strong you are, I can still kill you while you sleep.)
In a state of nature we would all be at war with each other.
"Hobbes' answer is a thought experiment," explains political philosopher Quentin Skinner, "It is as if we each agreed with each other upon a representative - someone whose will shall count as our will. Now, we could agree that that person - it's obviously a fictional person - is all of us. That would be democracy.
"Or we could agree on some person - that would be monarchy; or a group - that would be aristocracy. So representation is tied as closely as possible to authorisation. Now you see ingeniously why you have a moral obligation to obey the state because it's almost a rational obligation. The agent of the state when he or they or she acts is performing your will."
We benefit from setting aside our native sense of justice and complying with a system of laws. At least we do if we can expect others also to comply with those laws.
And we can expect others to do so only if the law is consistently enforced. In this way, coercion is the foundation of our voluntary cooperation.
This is not an argument for authoritarianism or for the absolute power of sovereigns, as Hobbes believed it to be.
On the contrary, a liberal legal regime, which constrains people no more than required to keep us safe from each other, is most likely to sustain voluntary compliance.
We live in a society where most of us need fear neither our neighbours nor the police. That is a precious achievement.
Maintaining it requires politicians, judges and policemen to remain committed to the rule of law. They must defend our expectation that others will be held to the rules that we voluntarily abide by.


Engraving of London's notorious Seven Dials area
Once upon a time, England's cities were terrifying places

The New Pacific Theater Vở diễn mới trên sân khấu Thái Bình Dương

Photo: The U.S. and Australia try a new military deployment plan for the southwest Pacific
Ảnh: Mỹ và Australia thử nghiệm một kế hoạch quân sự mới ở Tây Nam Thái Bình Dương.

The New Pacific Theater
Vở diễn mới trên sân khấu Thái Bình Dương

Robert Haddick
16-9-2011

The U.S. and Australia try a new military deployment plan for the southwest Pacific
Mỹ và các nước đồng minh đang tiến hành những bước đầu tiên để chống lại sự trỗi dậy của Trung Quốc.

This week Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew to San Francisco to meet with their counterparts from Australia. The occasion was the anniversary of the ANZUS mutual defense treaty, signed 60 years ago in San Francisco's Presidio. That treaty was signed near the start of the Cold War, while the United States and its allies were locked in bloody combat against the Chinese army in Korea. This week's event in San Francisco was an effort to update the defense pact, with China again looming over the meeting.
Tuần qua Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng Leon Panetta và Ngoại trưởng Hillary Clinton đã bay sang San Francisco để gặp gỡ những người đồng nhiệm đến từ Úc, nhân dịp kỷ niệm 60 năm ngày ký kết thành lập khối hiệp ước quân sự ANZUS tại Presidio, San Francisco. Hiệp ước được ký vào thời điểm Chiến tranh Lạnh sắp bắt đầu, khi Mỹ và các đồng minh còn đang bị kẹt trong cuộc chiến tranh đẫm máu chống hồng quân Trung Hoa ở Triều Tiên. Sự kiện trong tuần ở San Francisco này là một nỗ lực đổi mới hiệp ước quân sự nói trên, trong bối cảnh Trung Quốc đang là bóng ma ám ảnh hội nghị.


Six decades later, the Korean War still seems to have a strong influence on the positioning of U.S. military forces in East Asia. U.S. ground, air, and naval forces remain concentrated in Japan and South Korea in the northwest Pacific, seemingly focused on the prospect of renewed fighting in Korea. North Korea's continued belligerence since 1950 created a requirement for a U.S. military presence in the northwest Pacific. Over the decades, the United States, Japan, and South Korea built up a basing structure to support this permanent deployment, which they have long settled into.
Sáu thập niên đã trôi qua kể từ đó, Chiến tranh Triều Tiên dường như vẫn có ảnh hưởng mạnh mẽ tới chỗ đứng của các lực lượng quân sự Mỹ ở Đông Á. Ở phía tây bắc Thái Bình Dương, không quân, hải quân, bộ binh của Mỹ vẫn tiếp tục đóng tại Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc, có vẻ tập trung vào nguy cơ xung đột lại nối lại ở bán đảo Triều Tiên. Thái độ hung hăng của Bắc Triều Tiên, kéo dài từ năm 1950, đòi hỏi phải có sự hiện diện của quân đội Mỹ ở tây bắc Thái Bình Dương. Trong những thập niên qua, Mỹ, Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc đã xây dựng một cấu trúc căn bản nhằm trợ lực cho sự hiện diện quân sự vĩnh viễn của họ, cái mà họ đã thiết lập từ lâu.


But China's improving air and naval power and its assertion of claims in the South China Sea are very likely moving the most important defense mission 2,000 miles south from where U.S. forces in the region are now concentrated. This mismatch is presumably not lost on the U.S. and Australian ministers gathered in San Francisco.
Nhưng tiềm lực không quân và hải quân ngày càng mạnh của Trung Quốc và việc họ ra yêu sách chủ quyền trên Biển Đông rất có khả năng sẽ đẩy nhiệm vụ quân sự quan trọng nhất đi xa 2000 dặm khỏi nơi các lực lượng Mỹ trong khu vực hiện đang đóng. Sự bất xứng này có lẽ không có tác động gì tới các vị bộ trưởng Mỹ và Australia đang tụ tập ở San Francisco kia.


In addition to pledging greater cooperation on cyberdefense (a problem increasingly blamed on sources in China), the United States will gain greater access to Australian military training areas, pre-position military equipment in Australia, obtain access to Australian facilities and ports, and establish options for more joint military activities in the region.
Bên cạnh việc cam kết hợp tác sâu rộng trong lĩnh vực an ninh mạng (an ninh mạng là một vấn đề ngày càng bị cho là nảy sinh từ Trung Quốc), Mỹ sẽ được tiếp cận nhiều hơn với các khu vực huấn luyện quân sự của Australia, thiết lập trước các thiết bị quân sự ở Australia, sử dụng các cảng và cơ sở vật chất của Australia, và đưa ra các lựa chọn cho những hoạt động quân sự chung trong khu vực.

This step-up in military coordination with Australia follows similar U.S. diplomatic forays around the South China Sea. In 2005, the United States and Singapore signed a strategic framework agreement on military cooperation that was expanded this year with an agreement to deploy new U.S. Navy littoral combat ships to Singapore. The deepening of this agreement will enhance the ability of the U.S. Navy to support the multilateral military training exercises it leads every year with partners around the South China Sea.
Bước tiến triển này trong việc hợp tác về quân sự với Australia diễn ra tiếp sau các động thái ngoại giao tương tự của Mỹ xung quanh khu vực Biển Đông. Vào năm 2005, Mỹ và Singapore ký một hiệp định khung chiến lược về hợp tác quân sự, mà tới năm nay đã được mở rộng thêm bằng một điều ước nhằm triển khai tàu chiến của hải quân Mỹ tới Singapore. Việc mở rộng thêm hiệp định như vậy sẽ làm tăng khả năng hải quân Mỹ hỗ trợ các hoạt động huấn luyện quân sự đa phương mà họ vẫn đi đầu thực hiện hàng năm với các đối tác trên khắp Biển Đông.


However, Washington appears to be taking a notably different approach in the southwest Pacific. Unlike its agreement with Japan and South Korea, the new agreements with Australia and Singapore, along with other low-key arrangements with the Philippines and others in the region, do not call for the permanent basing of U.S. combat units in these countries. Both the United States and its partners in the region have an interest in maintaining the "forward presence" of U.S. military forces in the region. But the permanent bases and garrisons in South Korea and Japan have become corrosive, especially on Okinawa, where the local population has become hostile to the U.S. military presence. In addition, restrictions on training areas in Japan and South Korea are impairing the readiness of U.S. forces there and reducing the utility of their presence.
Tuy nhiên, Washington có vẻ như đang áp dụng một cách tiếp cận khác biệt rõ nét trên vùng tây nam Thái Bình Dương. Không như điều ước ký với Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc, các hiệp định mới với Australia và Singapore, cùng với các thỏa thuận hạn chế khác với Philippines và các nước khác trong khu vực, không kêu gọi Mỹ phải đóng quân vĩnh viễn ở những nước này. Cả Mỹ và các đối tác trong khu vực đều có lợi ích trong việc duy trì “sự hiện diện tăng cường” của quân đội Mỹ trong khu vực. Nhưng các căn cứ và đơn vị đồn trú dài hạn ở Hàn Quốc và Nhật Bản đang hao mòn dần, đặc biệt ở Okinawa, nơi cộng đồng dân cư địa phương đã trở nên thù địch với quân Mỹ. Ngoài ra, những hạn chế tại các khu vực huấn luyện quân sự trên đất Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc đang làm hỏng tính cơ động của quân Mỹ và khiến sự có mặt của họ không còn hữu ích.


The model the U.S. planners appear to have in mind for Australia, Singapore, and around the South China Sea involves regular and frequent training exercises, temporary access to host countries' facilities, and frequent consultation by staff officers and advisors. For training exercises or in response to crises, U.S. air and ground forces would fly in and meet up with pre-positioned equipment, with naval forces arriving soon thereafter. This method would avoid the political friction the United States has encountered in Japan and South Korea and allow U.S. soldiers to remain at bases inside the United States that have better training facilities and provide better living arrangements for soldiers and their families.
Có lẽ mô hình mà các nhà hoạch định chính sách của Mỹ định hình để áp dụng đối với Australia, Singapore, và khu vực Biển Đông, đòi hỏi phải tập trận thường xuyên, phải được quyền ra vào vĩnh viễn các cơ sở của nước chủ nhà, và tham vấn thường xuyên các sĩ quan và cố vấn. Để tập trận hoặc để đối phó với khủng hoảng, không quân và bộ binh Mỹ phải bay vào và tiếp cận trước các trang thiết bị, cơ sở vật chất, sau đó hải quân Mỹ mới tiến vào sớm. Phương pháp này sẽ giúp Mỹ tránh được các xích mích, va chạm về chính trị mà họ từng gặp phải ở Nhật Bản và Hàn Quốc, và cho phép quân Mỹ cứ tiếp tục đóng tại các căn cứ ở Mỹ, nơi có cơ sở vật chất tốt hơn, điều kiện sống thoải mái hơn đối với các quân nhân và gia đình họ.


This new method of providing security for the southwest Pacific remains mostly a theory and will face increasing pressure if Chinese forces eventually threaten easy access to the region. But if the model succeeds, it could call into question the utility of maintaining the existing garrisons on Okinawa and South Korea, which in any case are increasingly untenable as the Chinese missile threat expands. The trick for U.S. military strategists and diplomats will be implementing this more flexible deployment model while simultaneously reassuring regional partners that U.S. security commitments are as firm as ever. As pressures increase, that trick may not be easy to pull off.
Phương pháp mới này trong việc mang lại an ninh cho khu vực tây Thái Bình Dương, về căn bản, vẫn là lý thuyết, và sẽ phải chịu sức ép ngày càng tăng nếu cuối cùng quân Trung Quốc đe dọa con đường Mỹ vào khu vực. Nhưng nếu mô hình thành công, nó sẽ đặt ra sự cần thiết phải duy trì các đơn vị đồn trú hiện nay ở Okinawa và Hàn Quốc, mà trong trường hợp nào, các đơn vị đó cũng càng ngày càng không thể trụ vững được, một khi mối đe dọa từ tên lửa Trung Quốc tăng lên. Cái khó cho các nhà chiến lược quân sự và giới ngoại giao là họ sẽ phải triển khai mô hình quân sự linh hoạt hơn này, trong khi đó lại vẫn phải đảm bảo với các đối tác trong khu vực rằng lời cam kết về an ninh của Mỹ vẫn kiên định như bất kỳ lúc nào. Khi sức ép gia tăng, cái khó này không dễ được hóa giải.


Does the Army need to prepare for another Afghanistan-sized training effort?
Quân đội có cần chuẩn bị cho một kế hoạch huấn luyện nữa với quy mô như ở Afghanistan không?

It took 20 hours this week for Afghan police and international troops to subdue the Taliban insurgents who attacked several high-profile sites in downtown Kabul, including the U.S. Embassy compound. U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker described the attack as "not a very big deal," while the coalition military commander, Marine Gen. John Allen, conceded that the Taliban "did get an IO [information operations] win on this." Eleven Afghan civilians, four police officers, and 10 insurgents were killed during the battle.


Tuần qua, cảnh sát Afghanistan và quân đội quốc tế mất 20 tuần để trấn áp quân phiến loạn Taliban khi chúng tấn công vài địa điểm quan trọng trong nội ô Kabul, trong đó có cả tổ hợp Đại sứ quán Mỹ. Đại sứ Mỹ Ryan Crocker nói rằng vụ tấn công “không phải cái gì lớn lắm”, trong khi đó tư lệnh liên quân, Đô đốc John Allen, thừa nhận là Taliban “đã chiến thắng về thông tin trong vụ này”. 11 thường dân Afghanistan, bốn cảnh sát, và 10 phiến quân đã thiệt mạng trong giao tranh.
Although the attack did not display much Taliban expertise or have much lasting effect, it raises questions about whether the effort to train Afghan security forces is on track. Last week the Rand Corp. released "Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan," a detailed study of the training program and its lessons for future large-scale training efforts. The report described the immense challenges specific to the Afghan case and cataloged numerous suggestions to improve the program.
Mặc dù cuộc tấn công không cho thấy nhiều về năng lực quân sự của Taliban, cũng không có ảnh hưởng kéo dài, nhưng nó đặt ra câu hỏi về việc liệu các nỗ lực huấn luyện lực lượng an ninh Afghanistan có đang đi đúng hướng. Tuần trước, Viện Rand Corporation phát hành báo cáo “Hỗ trợ lực lượng an ninh ở Afghanistan”, một bản nghiên cứu chi tiết về chương trình huấn luyện và các bài học rút ra cho những kế hoạch đào tạo với quy mô lớn trong tương lai. Báo cáo mô tả các thách thức to lớn, cụ thể trong trường hợp Afghanistan và đưa ra hàng loạt đề xuất cải thiện chương trình.


The Pentagon and the rest of the U.S. government have learned quite a lot about security force assistance from Afghanistan. There is a near-consensus among policymakers that successful assistance programs elsewhere in the world should be an effective and low-cost way of both preventing conflict and lowering the probability of future U.S. military interventions. The question for the Pentagon is whether the Afghanistan case, with its high level of difficulty, should be the standard scenario that U.S. forces prepare for.
Lầu Năm Góc và phần còn lại trong chính phủ Mỹ đã hiểu thêm nhiều về sự trợ giúp dành cho lực lượng an ninh ở Afghanistan. Các nhà hoạch định chính sách đã gần đạt tới đồng thuận rằng chương trình hỗ trợ thành công ở bất kỳ đâu trên thế giới cũng phải là một cách hiệu quả, chi phí thấp, để vừa ngăn chặn xung đột vừa làm giảm rủi ro Mỹ phải can thiệp quân sự trong tương lai. Vấn đề đặt ra cho Lầu Năm Góc là liệu trường hợp Afghanistan, với độ khó khăn cao như thế, có phải là kịch bản chuẩn mực mà các lực lượng Mỹ phải chuẩn bị đối phó không.


The Rand authors found numerous shortcomings with the Afghan security force assistance program during the time of their field research. That research wrapped up in 2009 just at the time U.S. policy in Afghanistan was undergoing a major overhaul, many changes in top leadership occurred, and a large infusion of additional troops, equipment, and money came in. The researchers found that the assistance effort in Afghanistan lacked a tight linkage to the actual security requirements in the country, lacked appropriate measurements for tracking progress, and did not match up well with the enfeebled capacities of the rest of the Afghan government. In spite of the steep challenges of training an indigenous army in war-torn and largely illiterate Afghanistan, much has improved since 2009, some perhaps due to the interaction between the researchers and the training staff in Afghanistan.
Trong thời gian tiến hành nghiên cứu tại hiện trường, các tác giả ở Viện Rand Corporation phát hiện thấy vô số hạn chế trong chương trình hỗ trợ lực lượng an ninh Afghanistan. Nghiên cứu diễn ra vào năm 2009, đúng vào lúc chính sách của Mỹ ở Afghanistan trải qua một cuộc đại tu, nhiều thay đổi diễn ra trên tầng lãnh đạo cao cấp nhất, và một luồng lớn quân chi viện, trang thiết bị, tiền được đổ vào khu vực. Các nhà nghiên cứu thấy là nỗ lực trợ giúp ở Afghanistan thiếu một sự liên kết chăt chẽ với các đòi hỏi thật sự về an ninh ở nước này, thiếu các biện pháp thích hợp để đo mức độ thành công, và không phù hợp với năng lực yếu kém của phần còn lại trong chính phủ Afghanistan. Bất chấp những khó khăn rất lớn trong việc phải huấn luyện một đội quân bản xứ ở một nước Afghanistan bị chiến tranh tàn phá với tỷ lệ mù chữ rất cao, từ năm 2009 đến nay, tình hình đã có nhiều tiến triển, một số tiến bộ xuất phát từ tương tác giữa các nhà nghiên cứu và đội ngũ sĩ quan huấn luyện ở Afghanistan.


U.S. policymakers have high hopes for using security force assistance to build up regional deterrence, help partners prevent insurgencies and lawlessness, and reduce the demand on U.S. forces for global security. Security force assistance and foreign internal defense training are normally tasks for special operations forces. But the training requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq were so large that conventional forces were drawn into the effort. The U.S. Army established new doctrine and wrote training manuals for conventional combat units reassigned to assistance duties.
Các nhà hoạch định chính sách Mỹ rất hy vọng là có thể sử dụng sự trợ giúp lực lượng an ninh để bảo vệ khu vực, giúp đối tác ngăn ngừa các hành động nổi loạn, hành vi vô chính phủ, và giảm sức ép đảm bảo an ninh toàn cầu lên quân đội Mỹ. Trợ giúp về an ninh và huấn luyện về quốc phòng là các nhiệm vụ thông thường của lực lượng đặc nhiệm. Nhưng yêu cầu về đào tạo ở Afghanistan và Iraq lớn đến mức các lực lượng truyền thống cũng được huy động vào công việc này. Quân đội Mỹ đã xây dựng học thuyết mới và viết các tài liệu hướng dẫn cho những đơn vị chiến đấu truyền thống nào được bổ về làm công việc trợ giúp đào tạo.


But a sharp reduction looms for the Pentagon's budget, with the Army facing a substantial cut to both its force structure and very likely its training budget (indeed, the assistance effort in Afghanistan is getting a big cut). The Army envisions its combat forces having mastery of "full spectrum operations," which could range from complex high-intensity offensives to "wide area security," peacekeeping, support to civil authorities -- and security force assistance.
Nhưng cắt giảm thật mạnh ngân sách của Lầu Năm Góc vẫn là nỗi ám ảnh. Quân đội Mỹ đang đối diện với nguy cơ cắt giảm đáng kể cả cấu trúc lực lượng lẫn ngân sách huấn luyện (quả thật, công việc trợ giúp an ninh ở Afghanistan đang bị cắt giảm mạnh). Quân đội Mỹ hình dung các lực lượng chiến đấu của họ đã làm chủ được “khả năng hoạt động bao trùm”, từ tấn công cường độ mạnh và tinh vi đến “bảo đảm an ninh trên diện rộng”, gìn giữ hòa bình, hỗ trợ chính quyền dân sự, và trợ giúp lực lượng an ninh.


But reductions in manpower and money for training will likely require officials to set priorities and make choices. Regarding security force assistance, Pentagon leaders will have to make a judgment about how many training resources should be consumed preparing conventional ground combat units for training duties. Do policymakers predict another "worst case" Afghanistan-scale assistance scenario, requiring training resources far above the capacities resident in the special operations forces? If so, in what other areas of conventional readiness are they willing to take risks?
Nhưng giảm nhân lực và vật lực cho việc huấn luyện chắc chắn sẽ đòi hỏi các quan chức phải xác định ưu tiên và lựa chọn. Còn về việc trợ giúp cho lực lượng an ninh Afghanistan, các nhà lãnh đạo của Lầu Năm Góc sẽ phải đánh giá xem bao nhiêu nguồn lực cần được chi cho việc chuẩn bị những đơn vị chiến đấu trên bộ để huy động vào nhiệm vụ đào tạo. Các nhà làm chính sách liệu có phải dự đoán một kịch bản hỗ trợ với quy mô như ở Afghanistan “trường hợp tồi tệ nhất” không, đòi hỏi những nguồn lực đào tạo vượt xa năng lực của lực lượng đặc nhiệm? Nếu có, thì ở những lĩnh vực nào họ sẽ sẵn sàng đón nhận rủi ro?


Over the past decade, U.S. soldiers have learned a lot about training indigenous security forces. Skill at security force assistance is a major U.S. asset just like aircraft carriers, fighter jets, and missiles. And it will have to compete with those other assets during the looming budget crunch.
Trong thập niên qua, lính Mỹ đã tìm hiểu thêm nhiều về huấn luyện các lực lượng an ninh bản địa. Kỹ năng trong việc trợ giúp lực lượng an ninh là tài sản lớn của Mỹ, cũng như tàu khu trục, máy bay phản lực chiến đấu hay là tên lửa. Và kỹ năng ấy sẽ phải cạnh tranh với những tài sản khác trong tình hình khủng hoảng ngân sách tiếp tục ám ảnh.